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Abstract. In order to achieve a systematic treatment of security proto-
cols, organizations release a number of technical briefings for describing
how security incidents have to be managed. These documents can suf-
fer semantic deficiencies, mainly due to ambiguity or different granular-
ity levels of description and analysis. Ontological Engineering (OE) is a
powerful instrument that can be applied for both, cleaning methods and
knowledge in incident protocols, and specifying (meta)security require-
ments on protocols for solving security incidents. We also show how the
ontology built from security reports can be used as the knowledge core
for semantic systems in order to work with resolution incidents in a safe
way. The method has been illustrated with a case study
1 Introduction
A key dimension in Security for Information Systems (SIS) is the document
generation and management. Reports on incidents, protocols and information
on systems play a structural role in the SIS paradigm. The uniform view of
SIS in an organization provides robust strategies and secure solving methods.
However, as it is said in [10], currently the reports generally describe information
security policies by a mix of professional opinion, staff experience, technology
manufacturer advice and external security standards or regulations.
It could happen these reports are useful only for members of the organizations
(which share the same implicit knowledge about this) or new paradigms forces
them to conciliate management methods.
SIS has evolved from a technical discipline to a strategic concept. The world’s
growing dependence on a powerful but vulnerable Internet – combined with the
disruptive capabilities of cyber attackers – now threatens national and inter-
national security. In [6] the influence factors in this particular case of security
incidents is summarized, showing the complexity and hardness of the problem.
The potentially vast number of disparate information sources makes their man-
agement complex and time-consuming (see also [10]). Although such knowledge
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may be consolidated by individual organizations, it is typically kept “in-house”
and the interoperability among different organizations could be a challenge.
Semantic Web Technologies (SWT) can provide a unified view to solve the
above-mentioned problems. On the one hand, the attempt to formalize the in-
formation described in the reports allows to emerge the knowledge. On the other
hand, SWT naturally solve interoperability problems. That is, the consensus ef-
fort to represent document knowledge by means of ontologies and data forces
the engineer to achieve the sound understanding of ideas, represented by means
of concepts, properties and axioms of the ontology. Thus the problem of under-
standing the structure of concepts to anticipate potential failures may be solved
by the combined work of Knowledge engineers and security experts.
Ontological Engineering provides tools to analyze important features as con-
sistency, compliance with current Security Standards, and fidelity to the intended
model [1]. The latter is about the sound representation of some concepts, this
means, whether the specification represents the intentions of security experts
and there are not axioms nor properties clearly incompatible with real concepts.
Therefore, the ontology-based approach enables the definition of security con-
cepts and their dependencies in an understandable way for both, humans and
software agents [11]. Beside consistency and complexity, the absence of repre-
sentational anomalies is mandatory [1].
In this paper we focus the interest in reports on incident protocols and security
requirements. It has been selected as running example the document set pub-
lished by Spanish INTECO–CERT institution1: INTECO’s identification and
report of security incident for strategic operators [3] and The operator console.
A Basic Guide to Critical Infrastructure Protection [4]. The first one aims to
be a guide intended to serve as a manual for action reporting and management
related to Critical Infrastructure and Strategic Operators incidents through the
INTECO-CERT. The second one describes the actions that operators have to
perform in order to provide an effective and efficient response to security inci-
dents. The documents provide a standardized protocol for both, effectively solve
and document security incidents in a SIS scenario.
Aim of the paper. The aim is to show how to use SWT to analyze and repair
security reports. It is based on the construction of an ontology from information
contained in the documents, showing how the construction of the ontology itself
allows to detect potential conflicts in protocols, documentation and classification.
2 Semantic Features of Security Documentation
A detailed analysis of the SIS documents must be performed from different
points of view. It is necessary to distinguish between classification (identifica-
tion of incidents) of SIS elements and the description level of security protocols
(for reporting or solving incidents). The representation of these features should
1 Acronym of spanish Incident Response Center Security
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Fig. 1. Strategy applied to SIS documents
to provide essential elements (classes and particular individuals) for the ontol-
ogy. The modular nature of the ontology should allow to extend aor modify
these elements without a general reconsideration of ontological commitments.
To achieve this modularity, the top levels of the ontology have to conciliate both
points of view, whilst low level classes will represent a set of particular elements
(usable actions, specific protocols, a set of possible identifications and classifi-
cations, etc.). Identification and protocol descriptions have different ontological
nature although they share some common features which allow to articulate the
ontology in two sub-hierarchies.
It would possible to specify identification and resolution protocols by means
of standard service ontologies (e.g. OWL-S or WSMO). In this case a specific
flowchart-based ontological description of protocols is selected. The reasons for
this choice are justified by the particular features of SIS:
• Description (at operator level) is simpler than standard service ontologies.
• The representation of protocols is very similar to their natural (graphical)
descriptions in documents, making them easily understandable.
• It provides a concise semantic description of the protocols which does not add
complexity to reasoning services.
• Because of natural mapping between actions and ontological elements, the
addition of new actions/description elements does not require SWT experts.
2.1 Strategy for Knowledge Recovery and Representation
The strategy for ontology extraction consists of several stages (see Fig. 1):
1. Preliminary analysis
– To state the scope and intended use of SIS document.
– Document analysis. Ontology engineers analyze the logical structure of
the document and isolate main concepts used within.
– To determine the ontological nature of different concepts. Elaboration of
a first categorization (possibly by building several hierarchies).
– To find potential ambiguities or deficiencies in elements to be included
in the ontology.
2. Ontology creation:
– Hierarchies and properties implementation. Ontology articulation.
– Design of axioms (classes specification) for the key concepts.
– Study of relationships between the former subhierarchies.
3. Comparison of different (sub)ontologies with standard security ontologies.
4. Semantic evaluation report (with improvement proposals).
Each step requires some discussion on the features of critical concepts. The
applicability of the ontology as semantic reference of future SIS systems has to
be taken into account. Due to the lack of space, only the main steps are described
in the paper, specially those where ontological analysis is relevant.
2.2 Representability of Security Issues
The proposed bottom-up approach is the natural choice because it is not in-
tended to build a (other) security ontology. It aims to build an implicit ontology
hidden in report documentation within an organization. The other approach,
the adoption of a pre-existent security ontology to formalize and clarify the SIS
documentation, does not seem a sound approach for these goals: Such an on-
tology usually describes an approach to SIS report/classification that can be
incompatible with the implicit knowledge in the concrete organization. It have
usually been built on security information resources, and, since these kind of
resources have not been designed to fit ontological structures, several deficien-
cies of representation arise. In [5], authors detect a number of representational
problems when enriching a security ontology with Information security:
P1: No concepts for some kind of vulnerabilities
P2: Vague connections between threats and controls
P3: No relationships between threats
P4: Inconsistent granularity of information
P5: Redundancy and overlapping of information
The bottom-up extraction of the ontology aid to solve most of the above-
mentioned problems for a particular organization (problems P1,P2,P4,P5) while
problem P3 rests explicit posed (to be solved by SIS experts). It is worthy to
note that the adaptation of a general security ontology for this task is hard to
automate, because some criteria for revision cannot be fully formalized.
3 Strategy for Incident Report and Identification (IRD)
This section is devoted to comment the main conclusions of the application of
the above described strategy to IRT documents [3,4].
Phases of incident response: According to [3], the description of the main
phases in incident response and mitigation of risk are (see Fig. 2, from [3]):
Identification (classification), contention and mitigation, evidence preservation
Fig. 2. Flowchart of action in a security incident according [3]
and legal considerations, documentation and recovery. The elements in these
phases have different nature. On the one hand, classification and identification
have static nature while actions correspond to protocols (non complex plans).
Static dimension versus Dynamic dimension: Preliminary analysis of docu-
ments show that two ontological dimensions are combined. The first one refers
to (statical) identification of main elements. The importance of this dimension
in SIS documents is due to solving/repairing/mitigation methods that strongly
depend on the secure identification. Despite that, it is hard to state the complex
relationship among different categories. SIS documents often enumerate elements
appearing in a particular organization. The methods often depend on such clas-
sification. However refinements of categorization aid to specify the methods.
The second dimension is about the description of dynamic elements of SIS
scenarios, as for example protocols and methods. The description of the protocol
is more precise than risk identification. This observation suggests to define precise
flowchart-based subontologies to describe them.
Features of Descriptional ontological level: The semantic description SIS has
the great advantage of allowing to compare the INTECO-CERT approach to
risks with other related classifications and/or ontologies, in order to evaluate its
soundness. Particularly interesting is to consider its relationship with the follow-
ing six general categories of information technology risk [14]. Note that concept
mapping between these general categories and INTECO-CERT categories pro-
vides useful insights to enrich the description of action classes related with them.
The relationship among both categories is depicted in Fig.3 . The relationship
Fig. 3. Descriptional class Risk and its relationship with categories from [14]
is rough and it has to be understood as a set of incipient refinements of the
ontology. It is interesting to highlight some of them:
– Malicious code and programs: The concept contains MalwareInfection.
Thus, ontology could be expanded by adding classes to prevent risks. It
requires protection at the individual and system level.
– Malicious hacking and intrusion: contains Hacking and InvasionAttack.
However, INTECO classification also considers malicious hacking whitout
intrusion (RefusalOfService).
– Fraud and deception: Description in [14]:
Various forms of attacks in the form of spoofing, masquerading, or salami
attacks have been used to do damage to privacy. Social engineering is often
an effective means to obtain illegal access.
First paragraph of the description corresponds to SocialMalware and part
of Hacking while the second one correspond to SocialEngineering. In this
case ontology is more specific than category from [14].
– Misuse and sabotage: Closely related with Vulnerability. It also contains
PolicyViolation. The first class is one of the underspecified concepts in
INTECO-CERT. The original category from [14] represents the resources
that can be misused, or vandalized through unauthorized access.
– Errors and omissions: Closely related with Vulnerability. According to
[14], this category assumes accidental (software) errors, to include unin-
tended destruction of files or data, as well as routing or transmission errors.
This also includes programming errors. Thus it seems that Vulnerability
class has not a good level of granularity in INTECO document.
– Physical and environmental hazard: It is out of the scope of Risk class of [3].
Ontological analysis of this kind of relationships among categorizations can be
used in other parts of the ontology, by using another related security ontologies.
Even it can induce to distinguish between safety and security, in order to re-
fine ontology in some SIS scenarios [13]. A more detailed risk classification and
description needs the formal inclusion of damage concept. This inclusion would
force to refine risk categories, as in [9]. Also, it is interesting to refine concepts
about cyber attacks from [6]. In this way the inclusion of target concept allows
the introduction of new mitigation strategies at dynamic level.
Dynamic ontological level. One of the INTECO–CERT/CNPIC tasks is the
response to security incidents reported as occurring in Critical Infrastructures
by users of this service, ensuring that the relevant information is stored. The
description of the process follows the scheme shown in Fig. 2 from [3], which can
be fairly represented using the flowchart representation. Although there exists
other ontological representations of flowcharts2, as it was already mentioned, a
specific sub ontology is designed to manage these critical elements in SIS.
Dynamic dimension of semantic analysis of SIS guides consists of flowchart
based representation of protocols. The version of this basic concept on the ontol-
ogy is depicted in Fig. 4. A singular feature of the ontology is the identification
between AtomicAction and FlowchartAction classes. This non orthodox equiv-
alence is the result of a group discussion among authors. Ontological distinction
between action and representation of the action within flowcharts is discarded.
In this way action class is used in both levels.
Although there are multiple variants of flowcharts (Petri nets, ASM charts and
so on), we can consider the simplest one, with only two types of nodes (boxes):
Action boxes and Decision boxes. The first ones contain a set of actions that the
user should execute in that state, therefore an action box must have one and
only one output path. They are represented as class ActionBox in our ontology.
The second ones are Decision boxes where the inner text is a condition to be
verified. The next current state depends on the value at which the condition
may be evaluated. This kind of nodes can have multiple output paths. Decision
boxes are modeled by class DecisionBox in our ontology. Fig. 5 it is shown
the hierarchy of classes of our sub-ontology. It can be seen that ActionBox
and DecisionBox are subclass of a more generic concept that we have called
InnerClass (representing the internal nodes of a flowchart). In this way some
restrictions on the classes can be added:
ActionBox  (= 1 hasOutputPath.Path),
DecisionBox  (≥ 1 hasOutputPath.Path)
As it is shown in Fig. 2 some kinds of flowcharts have two special nodes. Those
that don’t have an input path (i.e. input degree in the graph is equal zero) and
those that don’t have an output path (i.e. ouput degree is zero). This nodes are
represented in our flowchart ontology thanks to StartBox and EndBox classes,
2 e.g. www.daml.org/ontologies/183, www.daml.org/ontologies/306,
bioportal.bioontology.org
Fig. 4. Flowchart as basic element in representational dimension of the ontology




Thus, an instance of InnerBox must inherit both restrictions:
InnerBox  ∃ hasInputPath.Path, InnerBox  ∃ hasOutputPath.Path
Some other key concepts and classes of this ontology (but not shown in Fig.5)
are Condition and Path with the usual associated semantics.
The stage of (internal) ontology articulation allows to build semantic bridges
among the above sub-ontologies. In fact, descriptional and dynamic ontologies
share concepts of common ontological nature. This step produces the refinement
of the high level of the ontology.
With respect to ontology population, two main kinds of individuals for on-
tology population can be extracted from documents (protocols and incidents).
Revising population methods for security ontologies also suggests the need of
extending the information of the document.
4 Logical Specification of Meta-Security in IRD
Specification of the ontology opens the possibility of including constraints that
would be included in the SIS documentation (in natural language). Some of them
Fig. 5. Flowchart box element class
would allow to monitorize integrity/safety constraints. For example, the system
only considers as detected incident one for which it has an evidence:
Detection ≡ ∃hasEvidence.Evidence
Likewise, flowchart semantic specification allows to instantiate protocols, mak-
ing each one a complete and consistent representation of a security method. In
particular, only flowcharts representing approved methods can be included:
FlowChart  (≥ 1 represents.Action)
where Action ≡ AtomicAction ProceduralAction. The absence of classifica-
tion of an incident is prevented by a restriction axiom on the property originIn:
Incident  (= 1 originIn.Risk)
5 Related and Future Work
The paper shows how the construction of ontologies from security reports -
instead of selecting a standard security ontology- habilitates the use of formal
methods that insure their safety, by clarifying process and descriptions. As it
has been already commented in the introduction, it is not the goal to build (an-
other) ontology on security, neither it is a goal to reproduce a standard method
to extract one ontology from a document. The aim is to exploit the ontology
construction itself to clarify and revise security reports. Therefore, the key is the
application of SWT steps from the document information.
The evaluation of the overall process depends on two key stages that, because
of lack of space, have not been discussed in this paper. On the one hand, since the
process aims to debug and clarify security reports by means their specifications
and ontologies, the evaluation of the method has to be based on the feedback
from the report author. On the other hand, the secondary product (the ontology
itself) is evaluated by comparing it with standard ontologies on both the same
scope and the intended use. The soundness of the new ontology is useful to revise
the report itself. However, the ontologies built from standard security descrip-
tions are very useful to enhance the behavior of multi-agent-systems for security
issues (see e.g. [8]). Likewise, the tight relationship between the knowledge con-
tained in the report and the performed one allows to use reasoning services. This
feature needs of a refined classification of different reasoning services that will
be described in a next paper.
There exists a number of security ontologies with different features and scope
(see [2] for a general vision of the field). In general, security ontologies are built in
the traditional fashion in OE, whilst our approach is the re-use of OE methods to
validate reports in IRD framework. Of course, an information security ontology
should define the most important security issues and concepts and the relation-
ships between them. Thus reports, as these analyzed here, have to describe such
elements. Therefore, OE extraction methods will produce ontologies which can
be comparable with the former ones. By means of the comparison, it can be
estimated the soundness of the report, to induce refinements or reparations.
For example, it is interesting to compare the ontology with the Security On-
tology (SO)3 from [7]. Both ontologies complement each other with features as
risk identification (from ours to the SO) and countermeasures analysis (from the
SO to ours). Although it is evident that the countermeasure ontology from SO
is richer than [3], it can consider that it is useful as addenda of the document.
As future work, it is very interesting to recover knowledge from security re-
ports by applying Formal Concept Analysis (FCA)[12]. By using FCA it would
be possible to extract hidden concepts from the protocols which are susceptible
to be considered by the authors of security documents in the organization.
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